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 A Bewley decision maker cannot be indifferent between distinct monetary acts whenever his 
set of priors is fully-dimensional. 
 When there are only two states of the world, Bewley preferences are incomplete if and only 
if indifference is trivial in the above sense. 
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Abstract
Bewley’s (2002) influential model of preferences over uncertain prospects features an in-
complete preference relation and a set of priors over the states of the world such that one act
is preferred to another if and only if its expected utility is higher under every prior in that
set. This note shows that, under general conditions on preferences, the decision maker in
the Bewley model cannot be indifferent between distinct monetary acts whenever the set of
priors is fully-dimensional. In the special case of two states, in particular, such “objectively
rational” preferences are incomplete if and only if the indifference relation is trivial in the
above sense.
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1 Introduction
Bewley’s (2002) influential model features an incomplete strict preference relation and a set of priors
over the states of the world such that the decision maker prefers one uncertain act to another if
and only if its expected utility is strictly higher under every prior in the set. Since Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003), a natural alternative approach towards modelling this
robustness/unanimity preference rule has been to take a possibly incomplete weak preference relation
as the primitive and let it be represented instead by weak dominance with respect to every prior.
Bewley preferences of both types have been employed in general equilibrium theory (e.g. Rigotti
and Shannon 2005; Kajii and Ui 2009; Danan and Riedel 2013; Ma 2015), financial economics (e.g.
Easley and O’Hara 2010), contract theory (Lopomo et al 2011), mechanism design (e.g. Chiesa et
al 2015; Lopomo et al 2014) and social choice theory (e.g. Danan et al 2016). In addition, they
have motivated a number of decision-theoretic extensions (e.g. Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and
Schmeidler, 2010; Ok, Ortoleva and Riella, 2012; Galaabaatar and Karni, 2013; Faro, 2015). Since
Gilboa et al (2010), in particular, these preferences are commonly referred to as objectively rational.
This note shows that when Bewley preferences are defined on the Euclidean space of purely un-
certain monetary acts and satisfy standard regularity assumptions such as strict monotonicity and,
in addition, the set of priors is of full dimension, then the indifference relation associated with them
is trivial/degenerate in the sense that there exist no distinct choice alternatives between which the
decision maker is indifferent. This implies that, in the special case of two states (capturing, for exam-
ple, situations where an investment is either profitable or not profitable, or where a contracting agent
exerts either high or low effort), Bewley preferences are incomplete if and only if indifference is trivial
in the above sense.
2 Fully Dimensional Priors and Trivial Indifference
There is a finite state space S := {1, . . . , n} and the choice domain is the set of all acts f : S → R.
This domain coincides with the Euclidean space Rn. The zero vector in Rn is identified with 0. The set
of all strictly positive probability measures on S is rint ∆(S). A set P ⊂ rint ∆(S) is of full dimension
if it contains n linearly independent elements.
In the spirit of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003), it will be said that a
reflexive binary relation % on Rn admits a weak Bewley representation if there exists a continuous,
strictly increasing function u : R → R and a compact, convex set P ⊂ rint ∆(S) such that, for all
x, y ∈ Rn,
x % y ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
piu(yi) for all p ∈ P , (1)
where, in particular, the indifference relation ∼ that is derived from such a representation is defined
by
x ∼ y ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) =
n∑
i=1
piu(yi) for all p ∈ P . (2)
Following Bewley (2002), it will be said that an irreflexive binary relation  on Rn admits a strict
Bewley representation if there exists a continuous, strictly increasing function u : R → R and a
1
compact, convex set P ⊂ rint ∆(S) such that, for all x, y ∈ Rn,
x  y ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) >
n∑
i=1
piu(yi) for all p ∈ P , (3)
and with the indifference relation ∼ that is derived from such a representation also defined in Bewley
(2002) as in (2).
Proposition 1.
Suppose ∼ is the indifference relation that is derived from a weak or strict Bewley representation in
R
n by means of a continuous and strictly increasing utility function u : R→ R and a compact, convex
set of priors P ⊂ rint ∆(S). If P is of full dimension, then, for any x, y ∈ Rn,
x ∼ y ⇐⇒ x = y. (4)
Proof.
Let {q1, . . . , qn} ⊂ P be a set of n linearly independent strictly positive probability measures on S.
These exist by assumption and form a basis of Rn. Suppose x, y ∈ Rn are such that x ∼ y in the sense
of (2) and define z := u(x) − u(y), where, for any v ∈ Rn, u(v) := (u(v1), . . . , u(vn)). To establish
that x = y it suffices to show that pz = 0 for all p ∈ P implies z = 0. (Indeed, since u is continuous
and strictly increasing in R, it readily follows that u(x) = u(y) ⇔ x = y.) To prove the assertion,
suppose pz = 0 for all p ∈ P . It holds that
qiz = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n (5)
n∑
i=1
λiq
i 6= 0, for all (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Rn \ {0} (6)(
n∑
i=1
λiq
i
)
z = 0, for all (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Rn \ {0} (7)
where (5) is true by assumption, (6) follows from the fact that {q1, . . . , qn} is a basis of Rn, and (7)
is implied by (5). In particular, it follows from (6) and (7) that z = 0, which, in view of the above, is
equivalent to x = y. 
In the special case of two states, Proposition 1 implies that the indifference relation in the Bewley
model is trivial except when P consists of a single prior (in which case the decision maker is a subjective
expected utility maximizer). This special case is relevant for both pedagogical and illustrative purposes.
In view of the present analysis, for example, Bewley indifference curves for monetary acts over two
states are literally non-existent under weak regularity assumptions on preferences (see also below).
Assuming three states and using the Marschak-Machina triangle, Fig. 1 presents two examples of
compact and convex sets of priors P and P ′ that satisfy and violate the full dimensionality condition
of Proposition 1, respectively. Indeed, the two-dimensional triangle P is the convex hull of the three
linearly independent probability measures p = (1
8
, 2
8
, 5
8
), p′ = (2
8
, 1
8
, 5
8
), p′′ = (3
8
, 2
8
, 3
8
) and, in light of
Proposition 1, is associated with trivial indifference under both types of Bewley preferences. On the
other hand, the one-dimensional linear segment P ′ is the convex hull of q = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) and q′ = (1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
).
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Since P ′ does not contain three linearly independent probability measures, it does not imply that
indifference is trivial. Indeed, px = py = 0 holds for all p ∈ P ′ whenever x = (a, 0,−a) and y =
(b, 0,−b) are such that a 6= b.1
Figure 1: Sets of priors with/without full dimensionality
As far as the underlying preferences’ structure is concerned, the strict-preference version of Bewley’s
model that was asserted in Proposition 1 is characterized by axioms requiring  to be a strict partial
order that also satisfies independence, strict monotonicity (x ≥ y and x 6= y implies x  y) and open-
graph continuity.2 The weak-preference analogue of that model on the other hand is characterized by
axioms requiring % to be a preorder that also satisfies independence (as applied to such a relation),
strict monotonicity and closed-graph continuity.3
It is presently unclear if intuitive axioms on preferences exist that characterize full dimensionality
of the set of priors in the two versions of the Bewley model that are studied in this paper, and if the
indifference-triviality conclusion carries over to more general domains of choice under uncertainty. It
is also unclear if analogous results are obtainable in the extensions of the Bewley model that were
proposed in Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) and Faro (2015). Answering these questions is left for
future work.
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